úterý 21. července 2009

Pár odkazů pro zájemce o jurisprudenci, resp. o komunitární právo

Nedávno jsem obdržel notifikaci o novém el. čísle Oxford Legal Studies Research Papers (distribuované mj. prostřednictvím SSRN), kde je několik zajímavých článků z oblasti filosofie práva z produkce několika zajímavých oxfordských autorů, na které pro zájemce níže odkazuji. Současně jsem v nedávné době narazil i na dva zajímavé dokumenty pro zájemce o problematiku komunitárního práva, na které taktéž odkazuji.

Odkazy pro zájemce o ty právně-filosofické články jsou následující (odkazy jsou na SSRN a včetně abstraktů). Myslím, že takovým zájemcům nemusím ani autory daných článků, kteří se řadí ke špičkám oboru, představovat.

"Law and the Causes of Judicial Decisions"
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/2009
LESLIE GREEN

This paper tests Brian Leiter's claim that the American legal realists were proto-naturalists in legal philosophy and were therefore immune to objections based on claims that they offered defective analyses of legal concepts. It disputes Leiter's account of the core claim of American realist thought, and reaffirms the view that some of them were engaged in, or presupposed, conceptual work of a kind familiar to analytic jurisprudence. It explains how those who did not intend to offer conceptual analyses nonetheless made conceptual errors. It offers a fresh account of the basis of realist scepticism, deploying the idea of 'permissive sources' of law. The paper concludes with general reflections on the preconditions and prospects for 'naturalizing' jurisprudence, suggesting that Hans Kelsen was correct to think that such efforts are likely to change the subject.

"Can There Be a Written Constitution?"
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2009
JOHN GARDNER

The existence of unwritten constitutions, such as that of the UK, strikes some as puzzling. However the existence of unwritten constitutions turns out to be easier to explain than the existence of written constitutions, such as that of the US. In this paper I explore, and attempt to answer, some tricky conceptual questions thrown up by written constitutions.

"The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries"
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19/2009
NICOS STAVROPOULOS

Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative.

Odkazy na zajímavé zdroje z oblasti komunitárního práva jsou následující:

1) V první řadě se jedná o nový (druhou edici) Commission Staff Working Paper
Free Movement of Goods - Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing
Free Movement of Goods (Articles 28-30 EC)
, který přehledně shrnuje judikaturu v uvedené oblasti komunitárního práva. S díky EU Law Blogu za tento odkaz.

2) Dále se jedná o článek dalšího oxfordského autora, avšak tentokrát k problematice právních účinků směrnic.

The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and Exceptions
PAUL P. CRAIG

This article reconsiders the legal effect of Directives for private parties within Community law. This is a vexed issue that has generated significant academic commentary and much case law. The qualifications and exceptions to the basic proposition that Directives do not have horizontal direct effect continue to grow, thereby rendering this overall area even more complex than it was hitherto. The article seeks to shed light on this topic by subjecting to critical scrutiny the policy underlying the 'core rule' that denies horizontal direct effect to Directives, and considering whether the judicially created exceptions or qualifications to that policy are consistent with it.

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